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Making games isn’t a science

September 23, 2010

It’s not a science (though they can and do have science within)  – but game creation is also an art; as in it’s impossible to make a dead-cert hit.  You can (and we do) stack the odd more in your favour; adding a known IP to give it visibility, using tried and tested gameplay mechanics and so on.  But there is always the unknown factor – the variable that is impossible to pin down.  This variable is the risk and without it, you’re simple making the same as before, but it also means you can’t predict the outcome.  Why am I writing this now?  I was reminded of this in any creative enterprise via an interview with Sharleen Spiteri of the band Texas:

Q: What’s the greatest threat to music?

A: The labels. They don’t understand that music isn’t a science; they see that someone’s successful, and want to make a record that sounds exactly the same. But the point is to give the public something they don’t yet know they want.

It’s the same in games!

Gobsmackingly Cool Education – Peer Learning Turbo Charged!

September 22, 2010

I was very, very impressed by this video – in essence, they just put a computer connected to the net into places where kids have no access to eduction – and by using peer methods – helping each other – they soon learn, and learn and… learn!

Deus Ex Gameplay Video

September 21, 2010

Oooo!  I notice that the gameplay video for the very nice looking Deus Ex Human Revolution is now out, and it is looking good.  (It will also be in my mind when I go to see the godfather of cyberpunk speak in Bristol next month!)

Moving from the Hardware to Software Epoch

September 21, 2010

I have a lot of time for John Naughton’s analysis of technology events.  In another good column he charts the transition of the mobile area from one where it was the hardware that mattered to one where the software is tops – the smart phone era…

But there came a moment in the evolution of the mobile phone when suddenly the software was more important than the hardware. That moment was the arrival of the iPhone. And Nokia missed its significance for two reasons: its senior people – being hardware-focused – didn’t see it; and the company lacked the software capability to compete. It didn’t, for example, have a mobile operating system that was up to the job. In fact, it still doesn’t, which is why it will eventually be forced to buy one in from outside. The only available options are Windows Phone 7 and Google’s Android. So, in the end, it looks as though Nokia’s future will be as an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) of handsets running someone else’s operating system.

The Grand Unified Wiki Strategy

September 21, 2010

The Wikimedia Foundation has just completed a huge strategy project.  What I find interesting about the whole thing is not just the final results of the project, but the way it has been put together.  This is not a top-down diktat, but a bottom-up mission.   You can read it – and take part yourself!  The core mission emerging from it is:

  • Achieve continued growth in readership.
  • Focus on quality content.
  • Increase participation.
  • Stabilize the infrastructure.
  • Encourage innovation.

But also how they are going to achieved this – and there is a ever-moving list of possible ideas and suggestions…

Java applet support
Expert review
Allow image rating for Commons
Common watchlists
Distributed Wikipedia
A central wiki for interlanguage links
A “be bold” campaign
Real-time chat
Run an annual prize for best featured content

Which will eventually form the action plan.  I’m a big fan of Wikipedia.  Yes, I know there are people who gripe about it and I know it is going to have issues – any project involving the human factor will.  But beyond all that it’s an amazing achievement and is continuing to set new ground for innovative participation.

Here’s Jeff Jarvis on the process:

Gardner says they started the project with the knowledge that there would be “a high likelihood of failure.” It was possible, though unlikely, that no one would have come to the party. It was more likely, I’d say, that it would be taken over by fringe interests and nutty ideas. The foundation had to invest in success, hiring a facilitator who understood the dangers and a consultant who gave the project “a bedrock of information.”

There’s a lesson there — a lesson in all of this — for companies and government agencies learning how to do their business in public. It’s possible to collaborate at scale even on strategy. It’s risky. It needs care and feeding. But it can and should be done if you want to work in public, collaboratively, with your constituents, as they will expect.

A few other Wikipedia links!

What is the score with eBooks?

September 20, 2010

Amazon made a bit of a splash by saying that it was selling more eBooks than hardcover ones.  It’s one of those stats that may be referred to later on as an era-defining point…

But is it really true?  After all, there are lies, damn lies and statistics… This post suggests that the headline is more of a marketing thing and a reality.

You always have to ask questions with big headline stats like that – I wrote another post about the percentage of p2p use going down – which implied that p2p software per-se was in decline when it was nothing of the sort.

How to Kill Creativity – Layers

September 19, 2010

This is the ongoing issue of any organisation – when you are smaller and lean you can act fast and ideas flow well as they can be easily communicated.  However as you grow it gets harder and harder to allow the free flow of ideas and innovation.  In addition it also get harder to keep track of accountability – are people doing what they are supposed to be doing?  The oft used solution is to add layers of management – to control information and to ensure accountability.  Except that layers come with their own cost – the bureaucratic cost of running each layer and the speed cost that comes with it.  It’s a tough muddle.  Here is one account of how it went down at games developer Realtime Worlds:

More people in one team created knock-on effects elsewhere: more programmers needed to support more artists, more IT, QA and admin staff needed to support everyone else, more project managers needed to manage everything, and more recruiters to hire all these staff.  We hired a whole “business development” group that did, well, nobody else in the company got told what they did, except they hassled development constantly for “executive” progress reports (of course, making reports takes time, so this probably contributed to further hiring).  Then we hired a director of development, who while certainly helping us focus on on-time delivery, was sadly forced to spend much of his time fending this senior management layer off our backs.  Then we added a “program manager”, reporting to business development, to fulfil a nebulous floating cross-company communication role.  Someone above us came up with a “patent strategy” initiative; the engineers dragged along to the meetings managed to fend that off long enough for management to get distracted and forget the whole thing.  We hired a “live production” team, whose entire job seemed to be to pass messages between operations (the folks who run the servers) and engineering, on the basis that these two groups were struggling to communicate.  Unfortunately, they struggled to communicate with either group, and spent a lot of time creating Processes for how to pass these messages around.

All these layers, of course, generated extra meeting upon meeting.  When I worked on APB, my Outlook calendar looked like a game of Tetris, the day stacked full of meetings, usually with a triple-booking somewhere and several double bookings.  Hardly any of them held sufficient value for the time spent.

I don’t mean any of that to be a criticism of the specific people in those roles.  Many of these folks were wonderful, talented people, and many of them realised the problems they were part of and fought hard against them.  I was as much to blame as anyone.  I built a technology team that was too big for its goals.  I also spent a year in a nebulous “technical manager” role on APB, and didn’t do enough to fight the cultural problems, including the question of why I was there at all (and why I had so many meetings).

There is a theoretic number – Dunbar’s number – that is supposed to give the optimum group size that humans function in.  Dunbar’s number is set around 150.  Realtime Worlds were at around 300 people when they fell.   I think in all cases you always need to be striving to reduce the number of layers, to flatten hierarchies and to empower people to act.  That is no magic formula for organisations to have success – but if you want to breed creativity, they try to cut layers – because layers tend to absorb creativity.

More on Realtime Worlds

September 18, 2010

I’ve been reading all three (one, two, three) of the interesting posts about the fall of games developer Realtime Worlds.  There is nots of learning to be had in the post-mortem of the company.  Here are a few lessons that truck me.  First about engaging with users – this should be development 101!  It seems that a Realtime this may have not been the case

Let’s start with our attitude to the outside world.  Here we were, supposedly trying to build these great online games, but we were stunningly inept at outside interaction.  There were some high-profile release window gaffes – like attempting to BAN THE INTERNET FROM REVIEWING APB for a whole week – and then telling the world that they just didn’t understand our game – but it’s what we didn’t say that was most harmful of all.  We had this incredible secrecy around everything we did.  I liked this approach for early development – no point boasting about stuff that’s not ready – but at some point, with an online product, you have to engage your users.

Another is that feedback is a vital process to good development – and you need it, and need it to be honest (though at the time nobody – me included – really wants to hear it!)  We just have to deal with it – and those people who take the time to read it (and write it) are providing a valuable resource;

The really sad part is that, more often than not, we prevented or discouraged such people from helping out by building these bizarre internal divisions between groups.  I think this was a misguided attempt to imitate how other big online games run things.  For example, I once heard one of our fine QA staff being berated for – wait for it – emailing a summary of forum activity around QA.  This guy had gone through every single forum post looking for complaints that might signify bugs, and summarised it in a plan of action for the QA team to investigate further.  Commendable stuff indeed, but here he was, being told that ONLY OUR DEDICATED COMMUNITY TEAM were allowed to summarise forum activity for others (usually in the form of a number from 1-100 representing how favourable forum feedback was that week.  Never found out how they computed that or what we were supposed to do with it.)

Honest Post from Realtime Worlds

September 17, 2010
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This is a painfully honest – and very interesting – post looking at what when wrong at developer Realtime Worlds.  For those who don’t know, the studio just went under and a lot of people lost their jobs (including a couple of people I know…).  How did this happen?

The complacency showed through in so many ways.  We were complacent about game design, papering over APB’s obvious shortcomings and telling ourselves it would somehow come together at the last minute before release (an argument that was strengthened by the experience of seeing Crackdown do just that).  We were complacent about business planning, deciding to spend all our investment getting APB to launch, assuming that we would sell zillions of copies and over-spending on server hardware.  When we were told we were being made redundant, we were told something along the lines of “the market is just so bad right now … we could never have predicted this … even our worst sales projections were so much higher than this”.  I think that was supposed to be consolation but it was just complacent, and dumb.

It’s a gross generalisation to say the whole company was complacent.  It’s deeply unfair to a few pockets of incredibly passionate, hungry developers that worked their socks off and created some amazing stuff – like APB’s character customisation system, and its super-reliable back-end software, to name just a couple (apologies to all the other good examples of work I missed).  Sadly, it was not enough to overcome the problems.

Getting Fresh

September 16, 2010
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This is an interesting video – No matter what we do, we’re all in the fashion business.
It’s about how to make things remarkable – and in make people remark on it – and many people are into new, fresh, different stuff.

Whew.  It’s tiring just thinking about all that new stuff…